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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the district court's judgment dismissing Mr. Emesto Lopez's 
successive petition for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. 
B. General Course of Proceedings 
1. Underlying criminal and initial post-conviction proceedings 
On February 13,2006, Mr. Lopez pled guilty to felony domestic battery in exchange for 
the State's agreement to dismiss a second count and the allegation that Mr. Lopez was a 
persistent violator. CR (40751)1 p. 9 (Change of Plea Tr. p. 4, In. 12-17). Based on a previous 
jail visit with an attorney with the public defender's office, Mr. Lopez believed that he would 
receive a sentence of between thirty and sixty months. CR (40751) p. 4, 7. During the plea 
colloquy, the district court did not discuss the potential penalties or the district court's discretion 
regarding any agreements made as to sentence. CR (40751) p. 9-10 (COP Tr. p. 4, In. 12-17). 
As an afterthought, the district court inquired of counsel whether there was any recommendation 
as to sentence and counsel indicated that both parties were free to argue for whatever sentence 
they felt was appropriate. Id. at p. 10 (COP Tr. p. 7, In. 21-25). The district court thereafter 
sentenced Mr. Lopez to a unified term of ten years with a minimum period of confinement of six 
years. R. (37206) p. 45 (Sentencing Tr. p. 19, In. 8-15). 
On July 10,2007, Mr. Lopez filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. CR 
J Contemporaneous with this brief, Mr. Lopez is filing a request that this Court judicially 
notice the clerk's record and transcripts of the appeal from Mr. Lopez's initial post-conviction 
relief, Docket Number 37206. Citations to the record will thus be accompanied by their 
respective docket numbers. 
(37206) p. 4. Mr. Lopez raised several claims including that he pled guilty in reliance "on his 
misguided understanding from his counsel's insistence and assurance, that the matter would be 
dealt with minimally, and he would receive a minor sentence - that the court would follow the 
prosecutor's and his recommendation for such." Id. at p. 8. The district court granted Mr. 
Lopez's request for counsel and ordered that appointed counsel "investigate the matters and, if 
necessary, file an amended petition for post-conviction relief' within 45 days. Id. at p. 22-23. 
The district court then granted counsel's request for additional time to amend the petition so that 
transcripts could be obtained. Id. at p. 28. On November 14, 2007, the district court entered an 
order indicating the transcripts had been prepared and giving appointed counsel six weeks to 
amend Mr. Lopez's petition for post-conviction relief. Id. at p. 30. Approximately nineteen 
weeks later, Mr. Lopez submitted a pro se affidavit indicating he had received no communication 
from his court appointed attorney since July of2007, counsel would not respond to his 
correspondence, he was unaware of the status of his case and requested that substitute counsel be 
appointed. Id. at p. 48-53. 
On June 17,2008, appointed counsel filed a motion in which she indicated she would not 
be amending Mr. Lopez's pro se petition and requested an evidentiary hearing. Id. at p. 57. The 
State then filed an answer to which Mr. Lopez responded pro se on July 23,2008. Id. at p. 60-
71. In his response, Mr. Lopez indicated that he had repeatedly requested that appointed counsel 
amend his petition for post-conviction relief and that she refused to communicate with him. Id. 
at p. 68. 
On October 7, 2008, the State moved for summary dismissal. Id. at p. 72-73. On 
October 22,2008, Mr. Lopez filed a motion again requesting substitute counsel, indicating that 
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counsel refused to communicate with him, refused to amend his petition, and refused to respond 
to the State's motion to dismiss. Id. at p. 74-79 
At a hearing on December 18, 2008, the district court indicated that appointed counsel 
had notified the district court that she would not amend the petition because she believed that it 
was not timely filed. Tr. (37206) (Vol. 2) p. 1, In. 14-20. During the ensuing discussion, the 
district court revealed that Mr. Lopez's counsel had neglected to use the correct dates or to apply 
the prisoner mailbox rule in erroneously concluding that Mr. Lopez's petition was untimely. Id. 
at p. 2, In. 16 - p. 5, In. 17. The district court indicated that it would not rule on the timeliness 
issue but that there was "at least a good faith argument that he did file it on a timely basis." Id. at 
p. 5, In. 20-25. The district court then continued the hearing on the State's motion for summary 
dismissal and set a briefing schedule to allow counsel to interview Mr. Lopez and respond to the 
State's motion. Id. at p. 6, In. 20 - p. 8, In. 25. 
Two months later at a hearing on February 20, 2009, appointed counsel had neither 
responded to the State's motion for summary dismissal nor amended the petition. See CR 
(37206) p. 1-3; Tr. (37206) (Vol. 2) p. 10, In. 23-25. The parties and district court agreed that 
Mr. Lopez's petition was timely and the matter was set out to allow counsel another opportunity 
to consult with Mr. Lopez and to respond to the State's request for dismissal. Tr. (37206) (Vol. 
2) p. 10, In. 13 - p. 11, In. 19. At a subsequent hearing on April 20, 2009, appointed counsel still 
had not responded to the State's motion and was permitted to withdraw due to a pending Bar 
complaint against her filed by Mr. Lopez. See CR (37206) p. 1-3; Tr. (37206) (Vol. 2) p. 13, In. 
13-20. 
No one appeared on Mr. Lopez's behalf at a hearing on May 29, 2009, and the matter was 
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continued to explore who would be representing Mr. Lopez based on the unavailability of 
attorneys willing to accept post-conviction appointments. Tr. (37206) (Vol. 2) p. 18, In. 16 - p. 
19, In. 20. Another attorney was appointed shortly thereafter but moved to withdraw one month 
later because he had not been paid by the county public defender and was unsure who would be 
responsible for his compensation when the public defender was replaced later that month. CR 
(37206) p. 114-15. On August 4,2009, the district court reviewed the history ofMr. Lopez's 
various appointed attorneys, appointed the new county public defender to represent Mr. Lopez 
and again set the matter out to allow counsel to communicate with Mr. Lopez. Tr. (37206) (Vol. 
3),p.1-4. 
The new attorney appointed for Mr. Lopez did not amend his petition or file a written 
response to the State's motion. See CR (37206) p. 3. Instead, approximately six weeks after 
being appointed, he presented a very brief oral argument in support of Mr. Lopez's pro se 
petition. Tr. (37206) (Vol. 3), p. 7, In. 1-22. The district court dismissed Mr. Lopez's petition. 
CR (37206) p. 149. As to Mr. Lopez's claim that he pled guilty on his misunderstanding that he 
would receive a minimal sentence, the district court found: 
During the change of plea hearing Counsel for the petitioner stated that there was 
no sentencing recommendation agreed upon and that each side was free to argue 
what they feel is appropriate. (Feb.13, 2006 DCRT 5 1 :54-1 :59). During the 
sentencing hearing, the petitioner denied that there were any agreements with 
respect to sentencing recommendations. (May 16, 2006 DCRT 4 9:42-10: 16). The 
petitioner'S allegation is a conclusory statement that is unsupported by 
admissible evidence and contradicted by the record. 
CR (37206) p. 147. 
2. Successive post-conviction proceedings 
On March 26, 2012, Mr. Lopez filed a pro se successive petition for post-conviction 
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relief. CR (40751) p. 2. Mr. Lopez alleged that an attorney with the public defender's office 
visited him at the jail and advised him that the agreement called for a sentence of thirty months 
"minimum" and sixty months "maximum." Jd. at p. 7. Mr. Lopez thereafter spoke with the 
primary handling attorney by phone and that attorney confirmed Mr. Lopez's understanding. Jd. 
Mr. Lopez explained that he entered his plea under the assumption that he would receive the 
recommended sentence and that the district court did not inform him of the actual minimum and 
maximum penalties in accepting his plea. Jd. Mr. Lopez asked the district court to grant post-
conviction relief and amend his sentence to a minimum of thirty months to a maximum of sixty 
months. !d. at p. 4. 
The district court granted Mr. Lopez's motion for counsel on April 11,2012, and on April 
16, 2012, the district court issued notice of intent to dismiss the petition.2 CR (40751) p. 29-31, 
35. The district court found that the successive petition was barred by the statute oflimitations 
set forth in I.C. § I9-4902(a) because it was not filed within a year of the determination ofMr. 
Lopez's direct appeal. Jd. at p. 38-39. The district court also found that Mr. Lopez's challenge 
to his plea of guilty and ineffective assistance of counsel claims were raised in his initial petition 
for post-conviction relief and could not be raised in a successive petition. Jd. at p. 39-41. The 
district court provided Mr. Lopez twenty days to respond to the notice of intent to dismiss. Jd. at 
p.42. 
Approximately twenty-three days later, the district court received a pro se document from 
Mr. Lopez titled "Motion for Enlargement of Time to Respond to Notice ofIntent to Dismiss 
2 A difTerent district judge was assigned to the successive post-conviction case than had 
been assigned during the underlying criminal and initial post-conviction relief proceedings. 
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Application for Post-Conviction Relief' and a supporting affidavit. Id. at p. 44-48. In the 
motion, Mr. Lopez asked for additional time to respond to the notice of intent to dismiss "pro se" 
as "court appointed counsel's shortcomings has compelled Petitioner to ask this Court for 
meaningful opportunity to provide legal authority and facts that demonstrate the existence of a 
genuine factual issue." Id. at p. 47-50. In the affidavit, Mr. Lopez indicated that the public 
defender had not communicated with him regarding the district court's notice of intent to 
dismiss, that he would request substitute counsel and that equitable concerns dictated that he be 
allowed an opportunity to respond to the district court's notice. Id. at p. 44-45. 
The district court acknowledged that the pro se motion for enlargement of time was filed 
because "appointed counsel had taken no action to address the Court's Notice of Intent to 
Dismiss." Id. at p. 50. The district court nonetheless ordered the pro se motion stricken because 
Mr. Lopez was represented by counsel at the time it was tiled. Id. The district court then 
dismissed Mr. Lopez's petition finding that "it has been thirty-one (31) days since the Court 
issued its notice of intent to summarily dismiss and no response thercto has been filed." Id. 
Eventualli, final judgment was entered on behalf of the State. Id. at 79-80. This appeal follows. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court crr by striking Mr. Lopez's pro se motion instead of 
3 This appeal initially proceeded under Docket Number 40047-2012. On January 16 
2013, this Court remanded that case to the district court for entry of final judgment pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 58(a) on Mr. Lopez's motion. The district court then entered a Judgment of Dismissal, 
which did not conform with I.R.C.P. 54(a) and, on January 31, 2013, this Court dismissed the 
appeal without prejudice. The district court entered a second Judgment of Dismissal on February 
4,2013 from which Mr. Lopez filed a notice of appeal on February 20,2013. The instant record 
- Docket Number 40751-2013 - is substantially identical to the Clerk's Record prepared in 
Docket N urn ber 40047. 
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addressing his request for new counselor to proceed pro se and additional time to respond to the 
court's notice of intent to dismiss? 
2. Does the district court's error in failing to provide Mr. Lopez with a meaningful 
opportunity to respond to the Notice of Intent to dismiss require remand for appointment of 
counsel and an opportunity to respond to the district court's notice? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Erred by Striking Mr. Lopez's Pro Se Motion Instead of 
Addressing His Requests for New Counselor to Proceed Pro Se and Additional Time 
to Respond to the Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss 
In striking Mr. Lopez's pro se motion, the district court did not cite to any legal authority. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) allows a court to "strike from any pleading any insufficient 
defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter" on its own initiative. 
Mr. Lopez's request for additional time to respond to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss 
cannot be characterized as "redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous." Rule 1 1 (a) 
contemplates that a unsigned motion can only be stricken if "a pleading, motion or other paper is 
not signed ... promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant." 
Thus, neither Rule 11 (a) nor 12(f) provided the distriet eourt with authority to strike Mr. 
Lopez's motion. Nor does there appear to be any Idaho case law addressing the status of motions 
filed pro se while the litigant is represented. However, other jurisdictions allow courts to treat pro 
se pleadings filed while a person is represented as a nullity. In re Barnett, 73 P.3d 1106, 1110 
(Cal. 2003); Whiting v. State, 929 So.2d 673, 674-75 (Fla. App. 2006); People v. Milton, 820 
N.E.2d 1074,1081 (Ill. App. 2004); State v. Graddick, 548 S.E.2d 210, 211 (S.C. 2001). 
Nonetheless, requests to diseharge counsel and complaints directed towards counsel's 
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performance are a critical exception to this general rule. See In re Barnett, 73 P.3d at 1110 
(defendant who chooses professional representation, rather than self-representation, is not entitled 
to present his or her case personally except defendant may make pro se motions regarding 
representation, including requests for self-representation); Whiting, 929 So.2d at 674-75 (pro se 
pleadings filed by a criminal defendant who is represented by counsel are generally treated as a 
nullity unless they include an unequivocal request to discharge counsel, assert that counsel 
coerced the defendant into taking certain action, or reflect an adversarial relationship between the 
defendant and his counsel); People v. Pondexter, 573 N.E.2d 339,345 (Ill. App. 1991) (defendant 
represented by competent counsel must not be permitted to file pro se motions except to afford the 
right to file pro se motions while represented that are '-directed to defendant's attorney's 
representation"); Graddick, 548 S.E.2d at 211 (since there is no right to hybrid representation, 
substantive documents filed pro se by a person represented by counsel are not accepted except 
"the rule against hybrid representation does not bar pro se motions to relieve counsel"); Williams 
v. State, 946 S.W.2d 886, 892 (Tex. App. 1997) (court may consider pro se brief submitted by 
represented party when required by "the interests of just icc"). 
On April 11, 2012, the district court granted Mr. Lopez's request for counsel and 
appointed the public defender "or, if necessary, conflict counsel." CR (40751) p. 29-31. Just five 
days later, the district court issued notice of intent to dismiss providing twenty days to respond. 
Jd. at p. 35. Approximately twenty-three days later, the district court received4 Mr. Lopez's pro se 
~ It appears from the certificate of service that Mr. Lopez delivered his motion to prison 
officials for mailing two days earlier, on May 7, 2012. The mailbox rule deems a pro se inmate's 
document filed as of the date it was submitted to prison authorities for the purpose of mailing to 
the court for filing. Munson v. State, 128 Idaho 639, 641, 917 P.2d 796,798 (1996); Slate v. 
Johnson, 152 Idaho 56, 62, 266 P.3d 1161, 1167 (Cl. App. 2011). 
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document titled "Motion for Enlargement of Time to Respond to Notice ofIntent to Dismiss 
Application for Post-Conviction Relief" and supporting affidavit indicating appointed counsel had 
not communicated with him regarding the notice of intent to dismiss. Jd. at p. 44-48. Mr. Lopez 
asked for additional time to respond to the notice of intent to dismiss "pro se" or that substitute 
counsel be appointed. Jd. Thirty-one days after issuing the notice of intent to dismiss, the district 
court simultaneously struck Mr. Lopez's request for additional time and dismissed the case. 
Initially, the county public defender appointed in this case represented Mr. Lopez during 
the initial post-conviction proceedings. Compare CR (37206) p. 120 (Mimura Law) with CR 
(40751) p. 34 (Mimura Law). It thus appears that conflict counsel should have been appointed but 
that the public defender did not have the opportunity to assign conflict counsel given the 
proximity of the order appointing counsel and the notice of intent to dismiss. See CR (40751) p. 1 
(no notice of appearance reflected in Register of Actions). Accordingly, although nominally 
represented, no attorney had been assigned to Mr. Lopez at the time the district court struck his 
request for time and dismissed his case. 
Moreover, the pro se pleading struek by the distriet eourt requested additional time to 
respond to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss because eounsel had failed to do so. In 
reversing based on a trial judge's refusal to eon sider the defendant's pro se motion to dismiss his 
public defender, the Florida appellate court aptly explained the difficulty in refusing to consider 
such pro se requests: 
In the first place, if the claim is that the appointed lawyer is not doing the lawyer's 
assigned job, one might wonder how that failure would ever come to light and be 
appropriately remedied if the person who is suffering from this inadequacy is not 
permitted to do so. Simply ignoring a pretrial assertion of ineffectiveness of 
counsel means that the claim is left to be taken up in post conviction relief 
9 
proceedings .... The supposed rule that all pro se filings by represented defendants 
are a nullity thus makes no sense, at least in the circumstance of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, and may lead to a manifest injustice. It will almost surely 
result in a frequent squandering of public resources on wasted trials that have to be 
repeated. 
Graves v. State, 642 So.2d 142,144 (Fla. App. 1994). This reasoning is equally applicable in the 
post-conviction context where refusal to address the litigant's complaint against counsel leaves 
the issue to be litigated in future successive petitions challenging post-conviction counsel's 
assistance. Here, the district court's decision to strike the motion to proceed pro se rather than 
address the request has necessitated the instant appeal and/or another successive petition for post-
conviction relief alleging post-conviction counsel's ineffective assistance for failing to respond to 
the notice. Public resources and Mr. Lopez's substantial rights would have been better served by 
simply addressing the pro se request and having the action heard on its merits. 
Further, the district court's refusal to consider Mr. Lopez's request created a manifest 
injustice. Mr. Lopez asked for additional time to respond to the district court's notice of intent to 
dismiss, either pro se or with new counsel, because his attorney had not responded within the 
deadline set by the district court. The district court refused to consider the request because it was 
not made by the attorney and then dismissed the action becausc the attorney failed to respond to 
said notice. Such an outcome was profoundly unfair. 
Nor are the concerns underlying the rule prohibiting pro se filing while represented 
applicable in this circumstance. When counsel and client both file pleadings and motions, it may 
be difficult to discern exactly what issues and arguments are before the court. Additionally, the 
rule prohibiting such hybrid representation prevents confusion and delay. See Pondexter, 573 
N.E.2d at 345 ("a defendant, when represented by competent counsel, must not be permitted to 
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proceed unfettered, to file a stream of pro se motions, especially when the result is a substantial 
delay of defendant's trial.) However, these concerns regarding delay and confusion are simply 
inapplicable when the pro se motion requests to discharge or replace counsel. 
Aside from the obvious problem with limiting nonperforming lawyer claims to 
being filed by only the allegedly nonperforming lawyers, there is simply no good 
reason to adopt such a rule. There is absolutely no reason to believe that the 
machinery of justice will become fouled by the filing of ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims by represented defendants. Those that present no basis for any 
action by the court can be safely rejected. The court has ample powers to treat any 
abuses of filing by overly litigious defendants. 
Graves, 642 So.2d at 144. 
This case illustrates the problem of limiting nonperforming lawyer claims to being filed by 
only the allegedly nonperforming lawyers. Unlike those cases in which a stream of pro se motions 
are filed in addition to counsel's motions and pleadings, Mr. Lopez asked for additional time to 
respond to the notice of intent to dismiss because his attorney had not timely done so. The only 
documents in the record are those issued by the district court and filed by Mr. Lopez or the State. 
Although the district court appointed counsel to represent Mr. Lopez, no attorney had 
appeared in the case or timely responded to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss. In such 
circumstances, the district court was obligated to address Mr. Lopez's motion for additional time 
to respond either pro se or through substitute counsel. Therefore, this case must be remanded for 
appointment of counsel and an opportunity to respond to the notice of intent to dismiss. 
B. The District Court's Error in Striking the Motion Affected His Substantial Rights 
and Requires Remand for Appointment of Counsel and an Opportunity to Respond 
to the District Court's Notice 
Pursuant to I.e. § 19-4906(b), the district court may sua sponte dismiss an applicant's 
post-conviction claims if the court provides the applicant with notice of its intent to do so, the 
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ground or grounds upon which the claim is to be dismissed, and twenty days for the applicant to 
respond. See also Buss v. State, 147 Idaho 514, 517, 211 P.3d 123, 126(Ct. App. 2009). The 
notice procedure is necessary so that the applicant is afforded an opportunity to respond and to 
establish a material issue of fact if one exists. Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859, 865, 243 P.3d 675, 
681 (Ct. App. 2010); Flores v. State, 128 Idaho 476,478,915 P.2d 38, 40 (Ct. App. 1996). 
However, even if notice was deficient, this Court can affirm where an applicant responds to a 
notice of intent to dismiss and fails to provide sufficient evidence to support a claim. Ridgley v. 
State, 148 Idaho 671, 676,227 P.3d 925, 930 (2010); Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho at 865, 243 P.3d 
at 68l. 
Here, the district court refused to acknowledge Mr. Lopez's request for additional time to 
respond to the district court's notice and, thus, he was not provided with a meaningful opportunity 
to address the grounds set forth in the court's notice. Moreover, the district court's dismissal 
cannot be affirmed on the theory that Mr. Lopez's petition was entirely frivolous and, thus, 
appointment of counsel (or the opportunity to respond to the notice on intent to dismiss) was 
unnecessary. Although the decision to grant or deny a request for a court-appointed attorney lies 
within the discretion of the district court, '''[a]t a minimum, the trial court must carefully consider 
the request for counsel, before reaching a decision on the substantive merits of the petition. '" 
Melton v. State, 148 Idaho 339, 341, 223 P.3d 281,283 (2009), citing Charboneau v. State, 140 
Idaho 789, 794, 102 P .3d 1108, 1113 (2004). In determining whether to appoint counsel, trial 
courts should bear in mind that applications and affidavits filed by pro se applicants will often be 
conclusory and incomplete because they may not know the essential elements of a claim. Swader 
v. Stale, 143 Idaho 651, 653, 152 P.3d 12, 15 (2007); Judd v. Stale, 148 Idaho 22, 24, 218 P.3d I, 
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3 (Ct. App. 2009). Consequently, if the applicant alleges facts that give rise to the possibility of a 
valid claim, the trial court should appoint counsel in order to give the applicant an opportunity to 
work with counsel and properly allege the necessary supporting facts. Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 
792-93, 102 P.3d at 1111-12; Judd, 148 Idaho at 24,218 P.3d at 3. 
Here, the district court indicated it intended to dismiss Mr. Lopez's successive petition 
because it was untimely and because his claims for relief had been addressed in initial post-
conviction relief proceedings. The district court applied the incorrect standard in determining 
whether the successive petition was timely and application of the correct standard establishes that 
Mr. Lopez's successive petition was likely filed within a reasonable time. Additionally, there is a 
possibility that facts exist which would have supported a claim that Mr. Lopez's claims were 
inadequately presented during initial post-conviction relief proceedings due to ineffective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel and appointment of counsel could have assisted him in 
conducting an investigation into facts not in the record. Accordingly, the case must be remanded 
for appointment of counsel and an opportunity to respond to the district court's notice. 
1. Timeliness 
Applying I.C. § 19-4902(a), the district court concluded: 
The decision of the Idaho Court of Appeals affirming the denial of Petitioner's 
Rule 35 motion became final upon the issuance of the Remittitur on September 13, 
2007 ... There were no proceedings following the appeal within the meaning of 
LC. § 19-4902(a). Thus, Petitioner's time for filing a petition for post-conviction 
relief predicated upon claims arising from the Petitioner's change of plea in the 
underlying criminal case was one (1) year from the date the decision of the Idaho 
Court of Appeals became final; or, on or about October 4, 2008. Petitioner's time 
to file a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief challenging the change of plea expired 
long before his successive Petition was filed on March 26, 2012. 
R. (40751) p. 39. 
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The statute relied on by the district court I.e. § 19-4902( a) governs the time to file an 
initial post-conviction action. As to Mr. Lopez's initial post-conviction petition, the district court 
and parties agreed that it was timely filed. Tr. (37206) (Vol. 2) p. 10, In. 13 - p. 11, In. 19. "If an 
initial post-conviction action was timely filed and has been concluded, an inmate may file a 
subsequent application outside of the one-year limitation period if 'the court finds a ground for 
relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the 
original, supplemental, or amended application. ,,, Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 189, 177 
P .3d 400, 403 (Ct. App. 2008), citing I.C. § 19--4908; see also Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 
900,904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007). The Idaho Court of Appeals explained: 
The legislature has seen fit to not include a limitation period contained in I.C. § 
19-4908 and, as [the Court of Appeals hasl previously held, the limitation period of 
I.e. § 19-4902 is not renewed after the determination of an appeal in a 
post-conviction relief action. However, when a second or successive application is 
summarily dismissed because of the alleged ineffectiveness of the initial 
post-conviction counsel, application of the relation-back doctrine may be 
appropriate. Mellinger v. State, 113 Idaho 31, 740 P.2d 73 (Ct. App. 1987) 
(Burnett, J., concurring). This is so because failing to provide a post-conviction 
applicant with a meaningful opportunity to have his or her claims presented may be 
violative of due process. See Abbott v. State, 129 Idaho 381, 385, 924 P.2d 1225, 
1229 (Ct. App. 1996). 
Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 798, 992 P.2d 789, 793 (Ct. App. 1999). "The trial comi's 
analysis of 'sufficient reason' permitting the filing of a successive petition must necessarily 
include an analysis of whether the claims being made were asserted within a reasonable period of 
time. In determining what a reasonable time is for filing a successive petition, [this Court] will 
simply consider it on a case-by-case basis, as has been done in capital cases." Charboneau, 144 
Idaho at 905, 174 P.3d at 875. 
The district court dismissed Mr. Lopez's initial post-conviction action on November 23, 
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2009 and Mr. Lopez appealed. CR (37206) p. 149, 151. According to the district court, the Court 
of Appeals' opinion affirming the dismissal became final in June 2011. CR (40751) p. 37-38,41. 
Mr. Lopez filed the successive petition less than a year later, on March 26, 2012. In Hernandez, 
the Court concluded that one year was a reasonable time for an inmate to proceed with a 
successive post-conviction relief action if the initial action was dismissed due to ineffective 
assistance from the attorney representing the inmate in that proceeding. In Charboneau, the Court 
concluded that thirteen months after becoming aware of the allegations was unreasonable. 
Accordingly, whether Mr. Lopez initiated his successive petition within a "reasonable" 
time depends on the facts and circumstances of his case. Because the district cOUli failed to 
identify the correct legal standard pertaining to the timeliness of the successive petition in its 
notice of intent to dismiss and failed to provide Mr. Lopez with an adequate opportunity to 
respond, Mr. Lopez was denied the opportunity to describe the particular circumstances he 
encountered. Further, given that the successive petition was filed less than one year after the 
initial proceedings became final, it is probable that he filed within a reasonable time frame. The 
case must therefore be remanded for appointment of counsel and to provide an opportunity to 
explain that his successive petition was filed within a reasonable time. 
2. Facts possibly exist which would have supported a claim that Mr. Lopez's 
claims were inadequately presented during initial post-conviction relief 
proceedings due to ineffective assistance of counsel of post-conviction counsel 
In dismissing Mr. Lopez's successive petition, the district court concluded that 
"Petitioner's claims for relief in the instant case were previously raised and tully adjudicated in the 
2007 PCR Petition and that I.C. § 19-4908 bars Petitioner's 2012 Petition." CR (40751) p. 41. 
However, a ground for post-conviction relief may be raised in a successive petition if the court 
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finds "sufficient reason" explaining why the ground "was not asserted or was inadequately raised 
in the original, supplemental, or amended application." I.e. § 19-4908 (emphasis added). This 
statute "does not prohibit successive petitions for postconviction relief in every case, but rather, 
only prohibits successive petitions in those cases where the petitioner 'knowingly, voluntarily and 
intelligently' waived the grounds for which he now seeks relief, or offers no 'sufficient reason' for 
the omission of those grounds" in the initial post-conviction action. Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 
591,593,635 P.2d 955, 957 (1981). Deficient representation by counsel in an initial 
post-conviction proceeding, that causes a claim to be inadequately presented to the court, 
constitutes a "sufficient reason" to allow assertion of the same claim in a subsequent 
post-conviction petition pursuant to I.e. § 19-4908. See Palmer, 102 Idaho at 595-96, 635 P.2d at 
959-60; Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 189, 177 P.3d 400, 403 (et. App. 2008); Griffin v. 
State, 142 Idaho 438,441, 128 P.3d 975,978 (eL App. 2006); Baker v. State, 142 Idaho 411, 420, 
128 P.3d 948, 957 (eL App. 2005); Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 798-800, 992 P.2d 789, 
793-95 (et. App. 1999); Wolfe v. State, 113 Idaho 337, 339, 743 P.2d 990, 992 (eL App. 1987). 
Even before delving into the merits of Mr. Lopez's successive petition, there is reason to 
question whether he received effective assistance of counsel during initial post-conviction relief 
proceedings. The first attorney appointed to represent Mr. Lopez refused to communicate with 
him, to amend his petition or respond to the State's summary dismissal motion because of her 
mistaken impression the initial petition was untimely. The district court eventually outlined the 
correct legal standards and pe11inent dates for counsel and the State thereafter agreed the petition 
was timely. Nonetheless, despite two set overs to provide opportunity to meet with Mr. Lopez 
and respond to the State's motion, counsel still did not amend the petition or respond to the 
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State's request for dismissal before being allowed to withdraw due to a conflict of interest. After 
a delay related to the unavailability of conflict attorneys, an attorney was appointed who then was 
permitted to withdraw before undertaking any significant work on Mr. Lopez's behalf when the 
public defender contract changed hands. The last attorney appointed for Mr. Lopez did not amend 
his petition or file a written response to the State's motion and, instead, presented a very brief oral 
argument in support of Mr. Lopez's pro se petition approximately six weeks after being 
appointed. 
Moreover, the successive petition includes information that raises the possibility that Mr. 
Lopez's claims were dismissed due to ineffective assistance of counsel during the initial post-
conviction relief proceedings. In a supporting affidavit, Mr. Lopez explained that before the 
change of plea hearing, an attorney named Megan visited him at the jail and told him that the 
prosecutor "had offered a plea agreement sentence of (30) months minimum and sixty (60) 
months maximum sentence." CR (40751) p. 7. Mr. Lopez further alleged that he entered his 
guilty plea believing he would receive a sentence of between thirty and sixty months and that the 
district court neither informed him of the actual potential penalties nor asked Mr. Lopez about the 
sentencing recommendation. ld. 
The transcript of the change of plea hearing reveals a relatively brief plea colloquy in 
which the district court did not address the potential penalties. At the very least, the record must 
show that a defendant understands the possible maximum penalty which would be imposed as a 
consequence of pleading guilty. State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 36, 557 P.2d 626,630 (1976). It 
appears that the district court did not comply with Idaho Criminal Rule 11 or the requirements of 
due process in accepting Mr. Lopez's plea. It is thus possible that post-conviction counsel should 
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have amended the post -conviction relief petition to include a challenge to the validity of the guilty 
plea, a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to file an appeal from the plea or 
a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise the issue on direct appeal. 
Moreover, the district court did not discuss whether it would be bound by any 
recommendations made by either party and only briefly inquired of counsel regarding sentencing 
recommendations. After setting the date for sentencing, the following exchange occurred: 
District Court: 
Defense Counsel: 
District Court: 
p. 7, In. 21-25. 
And at this time the defendant will be remanded to the 
custody of the Canyon County Sheriff. 
One thing I did not - I will ask if there was any sentencing 
recommendation agreed upon? 
It's open. Each side is free to argue what they feel is 
appropriate. 
The record will so show, and the defendant will be 
remanded. 
The transcript corroborates Mr. Lopez's allegations that the district court did not inform 
him of the potential penalties or the district court's discretion with respect to the sentencing 
recommendations during the change of plea hearing. Although the district court belatedly asked 
counsel whether there was any agreement regarding sentencing recommendations, it did not 
inquire ofMr. Lopez's understanding. Further, Mr. Lopez would not have necessarily understood 
the briefreference to a "sentencing recommendation" being "open." 
Although Mr. Lopez acknowledged that he understood there were no agreements as to the 
sentencing recommendations at the sentencing hearing, that acknowledgment does not speak to 
Mr. Lopez's understanding at the time of the change of plea hearing. Moreover, the district court 
did not address the possible penalties during the sentencing hearing and, thus, the first indication 
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that Mr. Lopez faced more than five years could have come when the State asked the district court 
to impose a five year fixed sentence followed by an indeterminate term of five years. Although 
Mr. Lopez's counsel asked for a three year determinate term, he did not request any particular 
indeterminate term and did not request that the district court impose the sentence Mr. Lopez 
understood would be recommended. 
Further, the successive petition includes details regarding Mr. Lopez's understanding 
beyond the conclusory allegation in the initial post-conviction relief petition, which simply 
alleged he believed he would receive a minimal sentence. Particularly considering the 
circumstances surrounding Mr. Lopez's representation, it is certainly possible that post-conviction 
counsel failed to adequately communicate with Mr. Lopez and, thus, failed to provide additional 
specific information that could have prevented the district court from dismissing the allegations as 
"conclusory. " 
The record establishes that Mr. Lopez could possibly demonstrate sufficient reason for 
inadequately presenting his ineffective assistance of counsel's claims during initial post-
conviction relief proceedings and, thus, that he could litigate those claims in successive 
proceedings. Accordingly, the district court's error in striking his pro se motion affected his 
substantial rights and the case must be remanded for appointment of counsel and an opportunity to 
respond to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Mr. Lopez respectfully asks this Court to reverse the district court's judgment dismissing 
his post-conviction claims and to remand this case for appointment of counsel and an opportunity 
to respond to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss. 
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Respectfully submitted this c27day of August, 2013. 
, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
Ro yn Fyffe 
Attorney for Ernesto Garza Lopez 
20 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this;?;? day of August, 2013, I caused two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing to be mailed to: Office of the Attorney General, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, 
ID 83720-0010. 
21 
